OCTOBER 2024AEROSPACEDEFENSEREVIEW.COM9adversaries while sharing the burden of development. However, this cannot be achieved by accident and must follow from lessons learned in programs like the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, where allies came together to develop sovereign elements of the aircraft's architecture as well as common approaches for integrating forces in the fight. Such an approach still must overcome several current hurdles despite the best intentions and desires from Allied nation military and civilian leadership. Historically, on the space side one nation (often the U.S.) would field a program of record such as the Advanced EHF communications constellation or Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) for missile warning, and allied nations would "buy-in" or broker access to the U.S. system. Nations have recently discussed interoperating across allied constellations, particularly communications constellations, for which common standards would be a prerequisite. Though a significant step forward, interoperability still stops short of a true coalition approach. Ideally, implementing "Allied by Design" (a term coined by Ms. Deanna Ryals, U.S. Space Systems Command's Chief Partnership Officer)early in mission requirements and in the force design process would allow nations to take sovereign responsibility for their pieces of the architecture and ultimately maximize cost-sharing. Additionally, with the realization that U.S. and allied space power will be targeted early in a conflict, it is vital that space mission assurance considerations (that is, system resilience, defensive operations and the ability to recover/reconstitute) be a key part of that process. However, today these resilience and defensive capabilities are rightly considered crown jewels and having discussions among allies is typically difficult ­ a hurdle the US, UK, and Australia are working to overcome. The first obstacle is the process for sharing classified information with allies. The U.S.is often accused of over-classification, which may be accurate in many cases. However, the inherent fragility of defense capabilities warrants cautious protection, else they may be compromised. We must deliberately develop the infrastructure (both process and IT) to hold discussions with allies at appropriate security levels, to include U.S. industry-to-allied governments for help with the coalition - yet sovereign - space systems. The U.S. benefits by maximizing its industrial base and having force design oversight, and allies in turn receive the possible data. Second, as nations collaborate to design coalition architectures, it will be critical that they are willing to rely on one another for pieces of the architecture; else we do not achieve a coalition approach, but rather a set of overlapping redundant ones. For example, there is little reason for another nation to build out a medium-Earth orbit (MEO) navigation constellation that replicates GPS, but there could be tremendous value at another orbit. Finally, all allies must commit to a common understanding of timing. Varied budget and planning cycles it present challenges to synchronizing capability development with allies. Most analysts suggest a moderate probability of some escalatory conflict involving China and/or Russia before the end of the decade (and as early as 2026/2027 as stated openly by U.S. Space Force leadership). If we fail to achieve a coalition approach in time, it may be too late to deter or successfully engage in such a conflict. The opportunity to develop a true coalition capability across allied nations spans diverse missions ranging from communications to missile tracking, to counterspace and space control. We must change our central approaches to acquiring and fielding such capabilities and the way we think about relying on one another. We have found such syndicated approaches in other domains; now we need to overcome the legacy of standalone space capabilities to achieve strategic success and dominance in the space domain. WE MUST CHANGE OUR CENTRAL APPROACHES TO ACQUIRING AND FIELDING CAPABILITIES AND THE WAY WE THINK ABOUT RELYING ON ONE ANOTHER
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